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Abstract:  When the international monetary system was on the gold standard, 
China was the only country adhered to the silver standard. Silver functioned as 
currency in China but acted as commodity in international markets. Its price 
experienced downturn trend from 57 cents per ounce in January 1929 to 23.38 
ounces per ounce in January 1933. Then it increased to 75 cents per ounce in 
May 1935. Dramatic fluctuations in silver price seriously impacted Chinese 
economy. On the initial stage of the Great Depression, devaluated silver price 
led to currency depreciation which brought “good luck” to China. However, as 
Britain going off the gold standard in 1931 together with massively scale of 
countries giving up gold currencies, competitive currency depreciation 
stimulated silver to regain its price, which dampened Chinese domestic 
industries and facilitated an increase in silver exports.  China’s wholesale price 
index decreased from 114.78 to 99 and its monetary system endured awful 
shocks which directly led to governmental currency reform in November 1935. 
The main contribution in the paper is to figure out the monetary transmission 
mechanism in pre-war China. Based on the testing results of Spearman rank-
order correlation and Structural VAR model, a conclusion was drawn that 
exchange channel worked more significantly in the first period while monetary 
channel performed better in the second period. Historical analysis is conducted 
to further verify the conclusion. 
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1. Introduction  
The Great Depression broke out on 29th October 1929 when the New York stock market 
crashed and stocks tumbled to its lowest point.  This event developed into a global phenomenon 
without any economic entity could evade a serious slump. Deflation was transmitted from one 
country to another via financial links and seriously dampened their purchasing power. Dramatic 
decline in international trade together with descending wholesale price index represented the 
world economy sank into an ever-deepening crisis. 
On the initial stage of the Great Depression most of other countries suffered from 
financial crisis, while China was the only country experienced inflationary economy. The 
international monetary system was dominated by the gold standard. Financial crisis happened in 
gold-standard countries lowered people’s confidence in sovereign reserve currency and 
stimulated their demand for gold. Rising gold price relatively lowered commodity price and 
brought in deflation. Silver acted as a commodity in the New York market also followed a 
deflationary trend. However, China was a country on the silver standard. Descending silver price 
resulted in depreciation of Chinese currency. From 1929 to 1931, Chinese economy experienced 
inflationary economic booming which signaled China’s reaction to the Great Depression was 
different from those of other countries. 
It was not long before China run out of its luck blessed by the silver standard. Without 
well-performed financial and monetary system, Chinese economy lacked ability to protect itself 
from external shocks. The international silver price fluctuations would seriously impact China’s 
exchange rate, and meanwhile silver price was not determined by Chinese government. Silver 
price was influenced by various factors: global silver production amount, balance between 
demand and supply in international markets and major countries’ silver-related polities. China’s 
financial market was closely connected with the world silver markets. Its exchange rate and 
domestic price level were inevitable impacted by changes in international silver price. 
Unlike the first stage when decreasing silver price blessed Chinese economy, the second 
period from 1933 to 1935 witnessed ascending silver prices resulted in dramatic Chinese 
currency appreciation and massive outflows of silver stocks. Britain was the first country 
abandoned the gold standard and conducted currency depreciation policy in 1931. A group of 
countries followed its steps and induced a wave of competitive depreciation. Depreciation in 
previous gold-standard countries resulted in a rise of their commodity prices and international 
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silver prices. Appreciation of silver currency led to deflationary wholesale price in China and 
handicapped its trade situation. Trade deficits increased together with a new outflow of silver. 
When the federal government issued the Silver Purchase Act in 1934 which aimed at increasing 
international silver price twice, Chinese government had to conduct currency reform which 
suspended the silver standard.  
The contrasting economic situations caused by fluctuations in international silver price 
signaled the vulnerability of Chinese monetary system to the changes in global silver markets.  
Hence it is an interesting topic to figure out how exogenous silver price pressure was transmitted 
to China’s domestic economy.  
Two theoretical explanations would be discussed in this paper. Monetary transmission 
system could be divided into two categories- monetary channel and exchange channel. The group 
of economists led by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz supported the theory of monetary 
theory. Monetary theory develops its findings based on price-specie-flow mechanism, which 
means a country’s price level is determined by the amount of money held by central banks. 
Appreciation in currency would deteriorate trade balance and result in currency outflow. Less 
money controlled by central banks would limit their abilities to provide sufficient credits and 
domestic market would experience currency scarcity. Consequently commodity price would 
increase and further worsen the situation (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). However, another 
groups of scientists advocated the theory of exchange channel. Ralph G. Hawtrey and Gustav 
Cassel argued that the quantity of money circulated in one economic entity could adjust 
endogenously as a reaction to the exogenous price changes in global markets. Given an 
internationally determined value of gold or silver, a country’s exchange rate is just dictated by 
the conversion rate of its national currency into gold. Without impacting the currency reserves, 
wholesale price is a direct reflection of exogenous shocks (Cassel, 1920). 
In order to figure out which channel performed more significantly in pre-war Chinese 
economy, the variables of exchange rate and silver stock are denoted to represent the influence of 
exchange channel and monetary channel respectively. Likelihood ratio test verifies the rationale 
for dividing the whole time period into two sub-periods. The first time period ranged from 
January 1929 to January 1933, when global silver price showed a downturn trend. The second 
period started from February 1933 to December 1935, when silver price soared dramatically. 
With the help of Spearman rank-order correlation test and Structural VAR model, the regression 
results of each period supported the findings that exchange channel worked more significantly in 
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the first period while monetary channel performed better in the second period. However, only 
relying on data and econometric results lacked sufficient persuasion. I consulted historical 
archives to further verify the previous conclusion. These historical facts included the 
development of domestic industries in Lower Yangzi Delta, financial system in rural and urban 
areas and China’s trade situation. These historical findings confirm the conclusion that exchange 
channel acted as the primary monetary transmission channel in the first period and monetary 
channel worked more significantly in the second period. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sector 2 starts with historical contents of 
Chinese silver standard and banking system, followed by theoretical explanations of monetary 
channel and exchange channel. Then it gives brief summary of previous research. Sector 3 
illustrates the methodology utilized in this paper. It describes data resources, conducts unit root 
tests and likelihood ratio test, and then quantifies exchange channel and monetary channel 
through checking the results of Spearman rank-order correlation and Structural VAR model. 
Sector 4 provides historical explanations by analyzing the performance of exchange channel and 
monetary channel in two sub-periods respectively. The final sector gives the final conclusion that 
exchange channel worked more significantly in the first period while the monetary channel 
performed better in the second period.  
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2. Theoretical background 
2.1 The Chinese silver standard and banking system 
In the late 19th century, most of counties had given up the silver standard and adhered to 
the gold standard. China was the only country still using silver as currency and experienced 
massive fluctuations in domestic wholesale price (Bratter, 1930). Although silver currency had 
been circulated in China for centuries, it was not until the end of 1935 that a unified monetary 
system was established with a central bank controlling the right of issuing currencies. Without 
effective institutions to conduct independent monetary policies, Chinese domestic economy was 
exposed to the risk of silver price fluctuations in global markets. In this sector, I will provide 
background information about the Chinese monetary and banking systems, which helps to 
explain how the surge in silver price deteriorated Chinese economy and forced the government to 
carry out monetary reform in 1935.  
2.1.1 The Chinese silver standard 
Silver has been used as means of hoarding since Han Dynasty (BC. 206). During that 
time period, silver was not circulated in daily life. It was not until the Ming Dynasty (AD.1368) 
that silver officially became currencies as complements for copper coins used in prosperous 
wholesale transactions (Shiroyama, 2008).  The monetary system in Ming-Qing dynasties could 
be defined as “parallel bimetallism”. Silver circulated side by side with copper, at varying ratio 
and for different purposes. Copper coins owned small amounts of value and they were widely 
used in retail transactions. Meanwhile, silver was circulated as the medium of exchange in 
wholesale commerce, long-distance trade and tax payments because of its high value. Silver was 
used as bullion bars, or in the form of imported foreign coins (Leavens, 1939) 
With the development of Chinese economy, copper coins could hardly satisfy people’s 
daily usages. Silver gradually took the place of copper coins and became the major transaction 
intermediates. Copper coins still circulated in markets for retailing transactions, but the ratio 
between copper coins and silver varied in different cities or regions. Hence, it is not proper to say 
that Chinese monetary system was bimetallism in this time.  China adhered to the silver standard 
not only due to the mushrooming international trade required silver to function as wide-accepted 
clearing intermediary, but also for catering the need generated in economic activities.  
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Chinese currency in the early twentieth century could be classified into three main groups: 
silver Tael, silver coins and banknotes. Although these three major forms of currencies differed 
in weight, shape and areas of circulation, they were intimately linked. The exchange rates 
between them were determined by the fineness of silver contained in each currency and also 
influenced by local users’ consensus.  
Tael (Sycee) 
The silver Tael or Sycee was widely used as bank reserves or in large transactions. 
Historically, the Tael was a unit of weight, the liang (Shiroyama, 2008). The precise fineness of 
a particular Tael is difficult to determined, because it was fixed by weight and custom. Generally 
speaking, the Chinese Tael might be taken roughly as 1.33 ounces avoirdupois, but various 
standard Taels differentiated in fineness and circulated regions. The complicity of Tael system 
inevitably hindered long-distance transactions. But with the development of interregional 
business, commonly welcomed Tael gradually took the place of local less-used Tael. In the late 
nineteenth century, Taels gradually diminished into three categories. These three categories have 
been of national importance: the Shanghai Tael, the Kuping or Treasury Tael and the Customs 
Tael (Bratter, 1933). 
The Shanghai Tael acted as the standard currency in most treaty ports. It was also the 
base of China’s international trade for over 75 years (1857-1933). The Shanghai Tael was melted 
from silver bars or refined coins, but shaped into so-called “shoes of Sycee”.  Sycee literally 
means “fine silk” with a boat-like shape, or reference to the footgear of a Chinese woman with 
small bound feet (Leavens, 1939).  A shoe was about 3*3*5 inches overall and weighted around 
50 Taels or about 4 pounds avoirdupois. The name of smelting shops would be stamped in the 
metal. Its weight and fineness would be examined by Kung-ku-chu, an institution sponsored by 
Native banks. Detailed information of each Shanghai Tael like color, smoothness would be inked 
on surface. If we took a scientific view towards the measurements utilized one hundred years ago, 
their testing methods were far from accuracy or preciseness as we require nowadays. But margin 
error could not impede the circulation of Shanghai Tael so long as authorized evaluations from 
Kung-ku-chu were well accepted by all market participants. The value of a Shanghai Tael was 
determined by three factors: standard of weight, standard of fineness and the Shanghai 
convention. Generally speaking, equivalent fine silver content of a Shanghai Tael was around 
518.51 grains (Leavens 1939).   
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The Shanghai Tael was well-accepted by domestic mercantile and banking community. 
In light of its high value, Shanghai Tael was not usually used for daily transactions but reserved 
in bank vaults. Bank notes or checks based on Shanghai Tael were widely circulated. Most of 
wholesale-trade or foreign exchange transactions may utilize Shanghai Tael for international 
remittances. 
Kuping Teal, which equals to 1.096 Shanghai Tael, was used for government transactions 
under the Empire period. It was replaced by Chinese dollar under the Republic government. The 
Haikwan or Customs Teal, which equals to 1.114 Shanghai Tael, was merely used as a money of 
account.  These two categories of Teal were closely related to Shanghai Tael. In 1933, the 
contemporary Chinese government suspended the conversion of Shanghai Tael and issued 
Chinese dollar (Chinese yuan) as new currency.  All subsequent transactions should be 
accounted in terms of Chinese dollars. Since then, Teal left the stage of Chinese currency.  
Silver coins 
The developing path of Chinese silver coins could be separated into three steps. Initially, 
no domestically smelted silver coins were circulated in China. China lacked the technology to 
cast coins. Imbalanced international trade with Britain or other countries resulted in inflows of 
foreign silver coins. In the late 18th century, majority of silver coins circulated in treaty ports 
were foreign silver coins. Then in 1890 Zhang zhidong, a pioneer who absorbed foreign 
advanced technology to Chinese industries, produced the first Chinese-minted silver dollar at 
Canton (Ho and Lai, 2013). On the second step, China established minting factories that 
produced large quantities of silver coins without the necessity of getting authorization from 
central government. The national silver coins quickly took the place of foreign coins. By 1920 
imported silver coins were completely drove out of Chinese market.  Finally, governmental 
realignment of silver coins abolished the usage of Shanghai Tael. During the transition period 
between January 1933 and March 1935, the parity between Chinese dollars and silver price was 
kept at 1.295.  
Two major types of foreign silver coins circulated in China were Spanish dollar and 
Mexico dollar. The Spanish dollar was the principal form of silver firstly entered China. At the 
beginning of utilizing Spanish dollar, it was only accepted by the Chinese businessmen 
according to its weight. But as the coins became more familiar and widely circulated, especially 
because of their uniform weight and fineness, their convenience was recognized and turned into 
medium of exchange at Canton (Leavens 1939). In this period, massive inflows of foreign coins 
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acted as compensation of Chinese goods. From the early eighteenth century, the British East 
India Company started to buy tea from Canton and paid by Spanish dollars. One century later, 
American merchants travelled to China and utilized Spanish dollars in exchange for Chinese silk 
and other products.  After Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821, its silver 
production continued to be coined into dollars of the same weight and fineness as Spanish ones 
but with a new superscription. Mexico dollars began to flow into China instead of Spanish coins. 
Before the breakout of the Opium war, foreign coins were mostly used in Canton port, the only 
treaty port authorized by Qing Empire to trade with other countries. After the Opium war 
Chinese government was forced to open up several treaty ports along southeast coastline. 
Foreign coins began to be used widely in other cities like Shanghai or Amoy, and later 
penetrated into interior areas. In 1857, all accounts in Spanish dollars were converted into 
Shanghai Teal at the rate of one dollar per Tael (Leavens 1939). By the end of the nineteenth 
century, Mexico dollars became the principal dollar coins in circulation, which were named as 
“Mexican” or “Mex”.  
In 1890 Zhang zhidong opened up the first Chinese mint in Canton to produce silver 
coins. These silver coins were marked with a dragon design and contained inscriptions in both 
English and Chinese. They were circulated provincially rather than nationally. In later years 
other provinces set up their mints as well. There was no uniformed standard for weights or 
fineness of domestic smelted silver coins, and it led to a range of variety in their silver content. 
The actual daily exchange rate between the Tael and dollars was determined by the relative 
supply and demand in market, together with their content of pure silver. Silver coins issued in 
one region would be used on discount in another region, which definitely hindered economic 
transactions.  
Bank notes 
The central bank which took the responsibility to monitor the process of issuing bank 
notes was not appeared until 1935, when Chinese government conducted monetary reform. 
Before that most of the financial intermediates owned the rights to issue their banknotes, 
including traditional Chinese native banks and foreign banks. By 1907, one commercial bank, 
two government banks, and one provincial government bank owned the right to issue notes.  By 
1927, more than 28 commercial and 11 provincial banks were printing money (Shiroyama, 2008).  
The conversion of banknotes merely relayed on credibility of banks. A national law was 
enacted in 1914 which regulated the banknotes to be secured by 60 percent cash reserved and 40 
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percent securities (Cho, 2009). Based on calculation from Rawski, 13.3 percent of monetary 
supply was made up by bank notes, which was one fourth of silver currencies (Rawski, 1989). 
2.1.2 The Chinese banking system 
Before the World War II, Chinese banking system mainly consisted of three parts: native 
banks, foreign banks and commercial banks. Without a central bank to conduct monetary 
policies or monitor economic development, Chinese banking system worked smoothly during the 
prosperous period when silver price depreciated. Massive inflows of silver provided abundant 
credit and positive expectations of wholesale price. However, when the global silver price started 
to surge, Chinese fragile banking system lacked the ability to defend domestic real economy 
from shocks generated abroad. Silver outflows drained out domestic currencies. Bankruptcy 
started from interior areas where banking system was closely linked to agriculture. Numbers of 
native banks transported silver reserves to foreign banks located in treaty ports. It was not long 
before the inner land pressure transmitted to coastline areas. Chinese banking system faced with 
the danger of entire bankruptcy in 1935. 
Native banks were the most traditional form of financial intermediaries in China. 
Originated from agricultural economy, they naturally owned the features of wide-spread 
locations, close connection with social networks and high risk of default.  Chinese peasants 
worked in small-scale farms. Their costs and returns of agricultural products were profoundly 
influenced by climatic situations. Hence their financial condition was instable. During the 
seeding and gathering seasons, farmers had to borrow money from native banks and pay back 
loans when they earned money. Interconnected social networks and good reputation guaranteed 
the business of native banks. These private owned agencies undertook unlimited liability for the 
discharge of bank obligation. As Rawski stated that “The ch’ien-chuang (native banks) accepted 
deposits, extended loans and undertook direct investments in business ventures, conducted 
interregional transfers, prepared and accepted bills of exchange, issued banknotes and orders 
(promises to pay specific sums on specified future dates). Transferred funds among depositors, 
and preformed other functions associated with these services. Although free of government 
supervision, the ch’ien-chuang were subject to self-regulation through their own field, which 
also performed some central banking functions, including the provision of interbank clearing 
facilities in the largest commercial centers” (Rawski, 1989). 
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Foreign banks were established in treaty ports when China had to open up the trade with 
other countries. Initially, foreign banks were functioned as intermediates for exchanging 
currencies in overseas export and import transactions. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank was 
the first established foreign bank in 1864 (Rawski, 1989).  It offered financial service to British 
merchants. With more countries setting up trade relationships with China, their banking 
delegations were set up in treaty ports. Until the Sino-Japanese war broke out, fifty-three foreign 
banks owned 150 branches in China.  They monopolized currency exchange services and 
controlled China’s foreign debt and indemnity payment. Foreign banks were rich in short-term 
silver cash flows, so they acted as loans providers for native banks and government institutions. 
They also attracted deposits from China’s wealthy class due to lower political risks and stable 
interest rates. Inter-bank borrowing was common in the early 1930s. Massive amount of silver 
gathered in treaty ports from interior areas or aboard facilitated foreign banks to arbitrage in 
bullion. They also acted as main players who exported silver out of China in 1934 when New 
York silver price increased and speculating space was enormous (Hu, 2013). 
Commercial banks came about much later than the previous two categories of banks. 
Warlords and politicians tried to pursue profits through capital operation. They also need 
institutions to monitor economic system and carry out monetary policies. Bank of 
communications was set up in 1908, which was the first commercial bank owned by government 
and undertook cashing managements of railways, telegraphs and postal industries. It also offered 
financial services to agriculture, mining, and trading institutions. The second government-
controlled bank was the Bank of China (1912), which offered foreign exchange transactions for 
governments. The other two commercial banks were Central Bank of China (1928) and Farmers 
Bank of China (1935). These four commercial banks had a profound influence on the monetary 
reform in 1935 (T’ang, 1936).  
2.2 Monetary channel and exchange channel 
From January 1929 to January 1933, New York silver price decreased from 57 cents per 
ounce to 23.38 cents per ounce. Countries stuck to the gold standard suffered a lot during the 
Great Depression. Their demand for gold stimulated three-year continuous increase in gold price, 
which relatively lowered silver price in international precious metal markets. However, since 
Britain first went off the gold standard in 1931, groups of countries followed its steps and 
conducted competitive depreciation policies. Silver once again became the target for speculators. 
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Meanwhile, a series of acts issued by the federal government guaranteed the appreciated 
expectation of silver price in future market. Since February 1933, silver price in the New York 
market increased from 25.88 cents per ounce to 74.69 cents per ounce, which almost rose by 
three times. China as the only country adhered to the silver standard; its domestic wholesale 
price index was serious influenced by global silver price.  In the first period, relatively 
depreciated silver price isolated Chinese economy from the Great depression because of 
inflationary price level. However, when silver started to regain its previous value, massive 
amounts of silver was exported abroad to gain arbitrary profits, which deteriorated Chinese 
fragile monetary system.  
Sticking to the silver standard forced the Chinese central government to abandon 
independent monetary policies. Domestic exchange rate and economic price level were exposed 
to the risk of fluctuations in international silver market. As a price taker, China’s economy was 
closely linked with global market. But how this linkage works or how the price pressure from 
abroad was transmitted into domestic economy needs further discussion. 
Previous economic theories that explain monetary transmission systems are divided into 
two categories. One group of economists led by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz promoted 
the theory of monetary theory. Monetary theory develops its findings based on price-specie-flow 
mechanism (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). This is to say a country’s price level is determined 
by the amounts of money held by central banks. More money controlled by central banks 
generally could be interpreted as more bank credits and moderately easy monetary policy. 
Slightly over-supply currencies lead to inflation which enhances rising expectation of 
commodities’ price level and further increases wholesale price index. Similarly, if central banks 
controlled insufficient currency reserves, breakages in monetary chains would occur and 
domestic price level would decline. Besides, the amount of currency held by central banks is 
determined by trade situation. Imbalanced trade would result in currency outflows or inflows as 
compensation (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). In a sum, monetary theory pays more attention to 
the relationship between a country’s currency stock and its trade situation. Inflow or outflow of 
currencies could alter silver stock and further influence amounts of currencies circulating in 
domestic markets, which results in fluctuations of price level. Monetary policy values monetary 
channel. In this paper, I utilized the variable of silver stock in Shanghai major finance 
intermediates to represent monetary channel.    
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The other group of economists advocating the theory of exchange channel is represented 
by Ralph G. Hawtrey and Gustav Cassel. According to Hawtrey and Cassel, it is possible for 
prices of gold or silver to change exogenously. The quantity of money circulated in one 
economic entity could adjust endogenously as a reaction to the exogenous price changes in 
global markets. Given an internationally determined value of gold or silver, a country’s exchange 
rate is just dictated by the conversion rate of its national currency into gold (Cassel, 1920). In 
exchange channel, exchange rate plays an essential part because it has direct impact on price 
level. In this paper, I used Chinese domestic exchange rate to represent exchange channel.  
If we conclude the transmission mechanisms in monetary channel and exchange channel, 
we could get the following logical relationships: 
Monetary channel: silver price increase       exchange rate appreciates        silver outflows 
/ trade deficits       silver stocks decrease      commodity price decreases      price level decreases      
Exchange channel: silver price increase         exchange rate appreciates       commodity 
price decreases       price level decreases  
2.3 Previous research 
Ho and Lai (2013) evaluated the exchange channel and monetary channel through the 
econometric method of historical simulation. They controlled the influence of exchange rate and 
silver stock to the wholesale price performance and estimated the anti-factual situation. After 
cutting down the monetary channel and exchange channel respectively, they found that exchange 
rate was the primary factor lead to price fluctuations in Chinese domestic economy. From 1929 
to 1931, China was under inflationary pressures when the world silver price was on a downward 
trend; whereas from 1932 to 1934, China suffered from deflationary pressures when the silver 
price was rising (Ho and Lai, 2013). Conducting the silver standard let the domestic economy 
expose to the exogenous shock in the global market, which seriously hindered development. In 
order to stabilize economy and carry out independent monetary policies, Chinese government 
executed currency reform in 1935 to prevent massive silver exports and deflation. In their mind, 
it is the exchange channel alone that transmits silver price pressure to domestic economy via the 
fluctuations of exchange rate.  
The other researchers mainly focus on the discussion of one channel instead of the two. 
The monetary channel seems to be more popular in the field of explaining monetary transmission 
system. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) emphasized the effect of trade balance under the 
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analyzing framework of monetary channel. They believed increasing global silver price from 
1933 to 1935 deteriorated China’s trade balance. More trade deficits called for export of silver to 
balance the trade account, which in turn drained domestic silver stock and caused deflation and 
recession.  
Rawski (1989) also supported the view that monetary channel worked more importantly 
in pre-war China’s economy. He calculated the Chinese monetary velocity from 1919 to 1936 
and he compared related data in two geographical scales: China proper and Manchuria. 
Combined with theory of Monetary Velocity, he believed velocity curve of Manchuria 
experienced continuously decline, which matched the typical feature of velocity in newly 
developing industrial counties. The faster economy developments, the sharper curve declines. 
However, the curve of China proper showed a ‘U-shape’ bottomed at the year of 1934, and then 
it had a slight increase afterwards. In that sense, China had hardly experienced prolonged 
depression after the U.S. Silver Purchase Act.    
Shiroyama (2008) also emphasized the importance of monetary channel through 
discussing the operation of China’s monetary and financial system. She argued that depreciated 
silver price enhanced China’s cost competitive and purchasing power. Although continuous 
decline in world wholesale price diluted the effect of currency depreciation in promoting trade, 
Chinese domestic industries seized opportunists to develop their productivity in the early 1930s. 
While the international silver price soared twice, Chinese trade situation was seriously damaged 
by appreciated currency. Trade deficits called for exports of silver to balance the account. 
Meanwhile, huge difference between silver price in foreign market and domestic exchange rate 
stimulated speculators to export money, which drained silver reserves and resulted in deflation.  
In contrast, Chang (1998) stressed the important of exchange rate channel in inducing 
Chinese economic disaster between 1932 and 1935. He argued that “By international arbitrage, 
Chinese dollar price of many commodities fell as a direct consequence of the appreciation of the 
Chinese currency, independent of China’s money supply.” 
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3. Methodology  
I followed the research methodology of Ho and Lai (2013), Bachmann and Sims (2011), 
Kilian and Lewis (2011), and Sims and Zha (2006). The method was widely used in quantifying 
transmission mechanism of monetary police to real economy. For example, Kilian and Lewis 
analyzed the extent to which the endogenous policy response of federal central bank to oil price 
shocks has contributed to real output contraction (Kilian and Lewis, 2011). Structural VAR 
model is used here to figure out the influence of exchange and monetary channels in Chinese 
pre-war economy. 
Denote 𝑆𝑃𝑡 be the New York silver price, 𝐸𝑡 be the Chinese exchange rate, 𝑆𝑆𝑡  be the 
silver stock in Shanghai major financial intermediates, and 𝑃𝑡 be the Shanghai wholesale price 
index. Starting the SVAR model from order: 
𝐴0𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑌𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡  ……………………………………….. (3.1) 
Where 𝑌𝑡 = (𝑆𝑃𝑡 𝐸𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝑡)′  is 𝐾 -dimensional vector of variables, 𝜀𝑡  denotes a 𝐾 × 1 
vector of structural innovations. 𝐴0 is a 𝐾 × 𝐾 lower triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal.  
Denote 𝐵 ≡ [ 𝐴1 𝐴2 … 𝐴𝑃] , and the VAR model is expressed as: 
𝐴0𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝐵(𝑠)𝑌(𝑡−𝑠)∞𝑠=1 …………………………………………………………………(3.2) 
 The response of the Shanghai wholesale price at horizon ℎ to a silver price shock at data 
0 and the response is due to variable 𝑖 could be expressed as: 
𝑑𝑃,𝑖,ℎ = ∑ 𝐵4,𝑚𝐾+𝑖𝜃𝑖,1,ℎ−𝑚       ℎ = 0,1,2, … ; 𝑖 = 1,2, …𝐾,min (𝑝,ℎ)𝑚=0 …………………….(3.3) 
Where 𝜃𝑖,1,ℎ−𝑚  refers to the {𝑖. 2}  element of the 𝐾 × 𝐾  impulse response coefficient 
matrix at horizon ℎ −𝑚. 
Through defining element of lower triangular matrix𝐴0 , I could isolate the mutual 
influence between exchange rate and silver stock, which is closest proximity of a controlled 
experiment available in empirical economics. Once the monetary channel and exchange channel 
are separated, the transmission mechanism of international silver price to Shanghai wholesale 
price is unfolding.  By comparatively observing the impulse response functions and structural 
decompositions of Shanghai wholesale price in separate periods, we could weigh the importance 
of exchange rates and silver stock as monetary transmission mechanism.  
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3.1 Descriptive statistics  
3.1.1 Data resources 
Non-stationary time series usually cause spurious regression results (Taylor and Taylor, 
2004). Before proceeding to Structural VAR analysis, it is necessary to provide descriptive 
statistics and the features of data we employ. The time series include New York silver price, 
Chinese exchange rate, Shanghai silver stock in major financial intermediates, Shanghai silver 
export amounts, Tianjin wholesale price and Shanghai wholesale price index from January 1929 
to December 1935. All series are monthly frequency and their origins are illustrated in Appendix 
A. 
New York silver price is expressed in US cents per ounce. After the First World War, 
there were two major international silver markets - London and New York. In each market, silver 
was expressed in local currencies. Most of British colonies circulated silver coins before they 
moved to the gold standard. International clearing between them enabled London as the biggest 
silver transmission market (Leavens, 1939). To some extent, silver price in London market might 
be more representative than New York silver price. However, as England going off the gold 
standard in September 1931, massive depreciation of sterling twisted silver price in London 
market. Moreover, a series of acts issued by federal government aiming at artificially increasing 
silver price facilitated the close bond between New York market and Chinese economy. In light 
of the research period ranging from 1929 to 1935, it is preferable to utilize New York silver price 
to represent international silver fluctuations. 
Chinese exchange rates are expressed as US dollars per 100 Chinese dollars. From fifth 
April 1933, Nanking government abolished Tael and unified currency unit as Chinese dollars. 
Foreign exchange banks began to quote exchange rates in foreign currencies per Chinese 
standard dollar instead of per Shanghai Tael. Bank accounts, contracts, securities and 
outstanding accounts expressed in Tael were converted into dollars at the fixed rate of Shanghai 
Tael 71.5 per C.H.$100 (Leavens, 1939). The statistical data shown before April 1933 were also 
recalculated to unified currency unit.  
Shanghai WPI (1926=100) consists of 155 commodities and clarifies into 8 groups: 
cereals, other food provisions, textiles and manufactures, metals, fuels and lighting, building 
materials, chemicals and miscellaneous. Tianjin WPI (1926=100) is collected from Nankai 
Ecnomic Indicators. Except for Shanghai, Tianjin was the only treaty port with statistical data in 
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pre-war China. There were other treaty ports which played important roles in Chinese 
international trade such as Canton, Dairen and Harbin (Hsiao, 1974). But due to data limitation, 
only Tianjin could be utilized as a representation of economic development in North Chinese and 
comparative variable against Shanghai.  
Shanghai silver stock in major financial intermediates is expressed as thousand Chinese 
dollars. Before the abolishment of Shanghai Tael, statistical data of silver stock in Shanghai 
major financial intermediates were illustrated by clarification of silver bar, Shanghai Tael and 
Silver dollars. Each silver bar imported from New York and London silver markets weights 
around 980 to 1198 ounces. Equivalent fine silver content of one Shanghai currency Tael equals 
to 1.2 ounce (565.65*0.9*.98=518.512 grains=1.2 ounce). Hence one silver bar equals 
approximately 1000 Shanghai Tael (Leavens, 1939). The silver stock data shown before April 
1933 were also recalculated to unify currency unit. Shanghai silver exports are expressed as 
thousand Chinese dollars. Due to the data limitation, monthly statistics are only available from 
1934 to 1935, while yearly data range from 1929 to 1935.  
Our data begin at 1929 when the world started to sink deep into the mire of the Great 
Depression. They end at 1935 when Chinese central government abandoned the silver standard 
in November, which successfully broke the close linkage between international silver price 
fluctuations and domestic price deflation. During the in-between six years, international silver 
price experienced downward growth trend and sharply increased as shown in Figure 3.1.  The 
turning point lies in January 1933, which was not long after Franklin D. Roosevelt successfully 
defeated Hoover and became the President in the United States. “Do something for silver” turned 
into a critical component of the New Deal as a reward for the election support from the silver 
bloc in the congress (Blum, 1959).   
Correspondingly, Shanghai WPI (Tianjin WPI) and the New York silver price are 
negatively correlated with a correlation coefficient of -0.76(-0.63) respectively. In the first two or 
three years, Chinese wholesale price levels experienced inflation instead of wide-spread global 
depression. Internationally growing demand of gold as currency reserves enhanced its ascending 
prices. As most of countries conducted gold standard in the late 1920s, currency appreciation 
lowered the price of commodities. Silver acted as commodities in New York market naturally 
experienced downturn growth trend. It decreased from 57 cents per ounce in January 1929 to 
23.38 ounces per ounce in January 1933, which shrunk half of its original value. However, silver 
functioned as currency in China and brought “good luck”. Relatively prosperous Chinese interior  
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Figure 3.1 New York silver price, Shanghai WPI and Tianjin WPI, 1929-1935 
 industries experienced fast development and optimistic expectations of real asset markets 
existed in treaty ports (Friedman, 1992). However, Britain going off the gold standard in 1931 
acted as a prelude of massively scale of countries giving up gold currencies. Competitive 
currency depreciation stimulated silver to recover from its devaluation, especially after federal 
government issued a series of acts aiming at artificially raising international silver price to 
promote domestic trade situation. From January 1933 to May 1935, silver price climbed from 23 
cents per ounce up to 75 cents per ounce, roaring fifth times. Meanwhile, Chinese wholesale 
price index decreased from 114.78 to 99. Massive amounts of silver was exported through legal 
channels or smuggling. Chinese monetary system endured awful shocks which directly led to 
governmental currency reform in November 1935 (Rawski, 1989). 
3.1.2 Unit root tests and Likelihood ratio test 
In empirical research, non-stationary time series often cause spurious regressions 
(Verbook, 2013). It is necessary to ensure that variables are stationary before conducting 
Structural VAR model. Well-accepted methods to testify stationarity are Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test. ADF tests are based on assumptions that the 
residuals are statistically independent with a constant variance. PP tests loosen this precondition  
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Table 3.1 Unit-root test results at logarithmic and first difference levels 
logarithmic level  Lag Trend or constant ADF Test statistic  PPTest statistic  Critical Value 
lnsp 1  C, no T -1.017 -0.883 -2.897 
lnp-sh 3  C, no T -1.341 -1.215 -2.897 
lnp-tj 1 C & T  -1.537 -1.526 -3.466 
lnss 1 C & T  -0.661 -0.676 -3.466 
lne 1 C & T  -1.802 -1.8 -3.466 
 first difference level Lag Trend or constant ADF Test statistic  PP Test statistic  Critical Value 
d_lnsp 0 C, no T -6.478** -6.463** -2.897 
d_lnp-sh 1 C, no T -6.452** -6.501** -2.897 
d_lnp-tj 0 C & T  -6.842** -6.843** -3.466 
d_lnss 0 C & T  -4.994** -5.119** -3.466 
d_lne 1 C & T  -8.392** -8.368** -3.466 
Note: ** represents variables are significant at 5 percent level. 
through making a correction to the t-statistic of coefficient 𝛾 and allowing serial correlation in 
residuals. The test results of unit roots at different levels are illustrated in Table 3.1.  Critical 
values for ADF and PP tests are chosen at 5 percent significant level. From the table, it is clear 
that all the variables are integrated at first difference levels I(1). Hence we need to use first 
different values to conduct Structural VAR model in the following sections. 
Whether there is structural break in the modeling system as we expected needs further 
discussion. The common testing method is to check likelihood ratio and figure out the existence 
of structural break. The testing equation is: 
𝐿𝑅 = (𝑇 −𝑀) ∗ (𝑙𝑛 � 𝑟� − 𝑙𝑛 � 𝑢𝑟�)~ℵ2(𝑞) 
Where T: the number of observations 
           M: number of parameters in each equation of the unrestricted system*number of 
lags + constant + number of dummy variables 
           ∑𝑟: Determinant of the residual covariance matrix 
           q: number of dummy variables * number of equations 
If adding a dummy variable to represent the structural break as we discussed in sector 
3.1.1, we could got the following test results in Table 3.2.  Calculated likelihood ratio for our 
model equals to 32.71 ( 𝐿𝑅 = (82 − (4 ∗ 2 + 1 + 1) ∗ (𝑙𝑛|4.67E − 11| − 𝑙𝑛|4.97E − 13|) 
=32.71). It is over critical value 9.47 (ℵ20.05(1 ∗ 4)=9.47), which rejects the null hypothesis that 
no structural break at 5% level. Separating the whole period into two sub-periods is reasonable. 
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Table 3.2 Restricted and Unrestricted VAR model test results 
  Restricted Model Unrestricted Model 
Number of observations  82 82 
Log Likelihood 509.85 579.79 
Det(Sigma_ml)   4.67E-11 4.97E-13 
AIC -11.95 -13.41 
 
3.2 Quantify exchange channel and monetary channel 
3.2.1 Spearman rank-order correlation  
The study period was separated into two sub-periods, one from January 1929 to January 
1933, and the other one from February 1933 to December 1935. The dividing point was January 
1933 when New York silver price reached its lowest point. Table 3.3 reports the Spearman’s 
rank correlation between variables during the whole period and two sub-periods. Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient measures the extent to which, as one variable increases, the other 
variable tends to increase without requiring that the growth to be represented by a liner 
relationship. All variables are integrated to the first difference level, so Table 3.3 illustrates 
Spearman’s rank correlation at the first difference level. 
In the first period, their mutual correlation coefficient equals to 0.884, which means one 
unit of decrease in New York silver price went together with 88.4 percent depreciation of 
Chinese exchange rate. They both negatively correlated with wholesale price index in Shanghai 
and Tianjin at over 40 percent and 30 percent respectively, which means fluctuations in New 
York market would transmit via influencing Chinese exchange rates and profoundly changing 
domestic price level. However, correlation between silver stock and price indicator is ignorable 
(-0.108). In the first period, one unit decrease of silver stock merely went together with 4.5 (1.38) 
percent inflation in Shanghai (Tianjin) market. Compared with 40.1(31.2) percent correlation 
values between exchange rate and wholesale price index, silver stock obviously showed less 
influence on domestic inflation during the early 1930s. Besides, one unit appreciation of silver in 
New York merely accompanied with 1.3 percent increase of silver stock. Hence, from January 
1929 to January 1933, inflation in Chinese market was transmitted from descending silver price 
in the New York market through exchange channel.  This analysis result confirms with 
viewpoint from Ho, who suggested exchange rates went through together with New York silver 
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Table 3.3 Spearman rank-order correlation between variables of interest 
From January 1929 to December 1935     
 
Exchange rate Shanghai WPI Tianjin WPI Silver stocks 
NY Silver price 0.772 -0.257 -0.238 -0.070 
 
NY Silver price Shanghai WPI Tianjin WPI Silver stocks 
Exchange rate 0.772 -0.260 -0.223 -0.026 
 
NY Silver price Shanghai WPI Tianjin WPI Exchange rate 
Silver stock -0.070 -0.153 -0.287 -0.026 
     From January 1929 to January 1933 
   
 
Exchange rate Shanghai WPI Tianjin WPI Silver stocks 
NY Silver price 0.884 -0.481 -0.459 0.013 
 
NY Silver price Shanghai WPI Tianjin WPI Silver stocks 
Exchange rate 0.884 -0.401 -0.312 -0.108 
 
NY Silver price Shanghai WPI Tianjin WPI Exchange rate 
Silver stock 0.013 -0.045 -0.138 -0.108 
     From February 1933 to December 1935 
  
 
Exchange rate Shanghai WPI Tianjin WPI Silver stocks 
NY Silver price 0.587 -0.017 0.075 0.150 
 
NY Silver price Shanghai WPI Tianjin WPI Silver stocks 
Exchange rate 0.587 -0.047 -0.051 0.276 
 
NY Silver price Shanghai WPI Tianjin WPI Exchange rate 
Silver stock 0.150 -0.381 -0.501 0.276 
 market and played a relatively more important roles in impacting Chinese wholesale prices 
compared to silver stock or monetary channels (Ho and Lai, 2013). 
In the second period, Now York silver price and exchange rate also have roughly the 
same correlation values against other variables. Their mutual correlation coefficient decreased 
from 88.4 percent in the first period to 58.7 percent in the second period. The growth pattern of 
exchange rates seemed less coordinate with that of New York silver price. Besides, their impact 
on domestic wholesale price declined from over 40 (30) percent to 4.7(5.1) percent in Shanghai 
and Tianjin treaty ports respectively. Comparatively, absolute values of correlation between 
silver stock and wholesale price increase from 4.5 (13.8) percent to 38.1 (50.1) percent in 
Shanghai and Tianjin market. From February 1933 to December 1935, silver stock values 
showed stronger correlation with wholesale price index which means monetary channel played a 
more important role in transmitting silver price pressure from abroad. 
In a sum, if we synthesize the findings in two sub-periods to the whole period, we could 
conclude that New York silver market was more closely linked with Chinese exchange rates than 
19 
 
silver stocks in Shanghai. Meanwhile, in the early 1930s, exchange channel functioned as 
primary way to transmit pressure generated in international silver market to China, while 
monetary channel acted more important roles in the later time. Besides, when exchange channel 
worked, it had a more significant impact on Shanghai market (-0.401) compared with Tianjin 
market (-0.312). But when monetary channel worked from February 1933 to December 1935, it 
held stronger influence in Tianjin port (-0.138) than shanghai market (-0.045). 
3.2.2 Structural VAR model 
Correlation could hardly be used as a proof of causality between variables because it only 
describes static patterns. Hence only depending on correlations is not enough to testify monetary 
transmission mechanism. Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model solves the drawback 
of causality prediction and deposes all variables into their expected and unexpected parts 
(Asteriou and Hall, 2011).  With respect to monetary policies, the SVAR approach recognizes 
that policy instrument at most times is determined by endogenous factors. Having generated 
reduced form of model with the help of a VAR system, SVAR analysis proceeds to identify 
model. 
VAR model treats all variables as endogenous and generates similar forms of impact on 
exogenous variables. SVAR model further identifies shocks into expected and unexpected forms. 
In Equation (3.2)  𝐴0𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝐵(𝑠)𝑌(𝑡−𝑠)∞𝑠=1  , matrix  𝐴0 is a 4 × 4 lower triangular with ones on 
the diagonal and 𝑌𝑡 = (𝑆𝑃𝑡 𝐸𝑡  𝑆𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝑡)′ is 4-dimensional vector of variables.  In order to stimulate 
historical fact, I defined New York silver price (𝑆𝑃𝑡) as an exogenous variable without influence 
from exchange rate (𝐸𝑡), silver stock (𝑆𝑆𝑡 ) and Chinese domestic price level (𝑃𝑡). In reality, New 
York silver price was artificially increased by governments’ actions such as Britain abandoning 
gold standard or the U.S. Silver Purchase acts. Chinese domestic factors like exchange rates or 
silver stocks could hardly influence silver price in international market. To some extent, China 
acted as a price taker instead of a leader. 
In terms of monetary channel and exchange channel, it is necessary to control their 
mutual influence in order to figure out the monetary transmission system. I defined their 
corresponding coefficients in matrix 𝐴0 equal to zero. That is to say, when exchange rate acts as 
exogenous variable, coefficient of silver stock equals to zero, which assumes silver stock has no 
impact on fluctuations in exchange rate.  Similarly, when silver stock functions as exogenous 
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Table 3.4 The form of matrix 𝐴0 and B 
Model: Ae = Bu where E[uu']=I  
Restriction Type: short-run pattern matrix 
A =    
1 0 0 0 
C(1) 1 0 0 
C(2) 0 1 0 
C(3) C(4) C(5) 1 
B =    
C(6) 0 0 0 
0 C(7) 0 0 
0 0 C(8) 0 
0 0 0 C(9) 
variable, coefficient of exchange rate is zero and it has no influence on monetary channel. Then 
Shanghai wholesale price index is impacted by other three endogenous variables together. The 
form of matrix 𝐴0 and 𝐵(𝑠) is illustrated in Table 3.4.  
I assumed exchange rate and silver stocks as two transmission variables. It is essential to 
further examine their dynamics. Impulse response function measures how long it will take until a 
shock in monetary shock reaches its full effect on the other variables. Figure 3.2 illustrates 
impulse responses to world silver price shocks from 1929 to 1935. Since all the endogenous 
variables plotted in Figure 3.2 are at first difference level, they represent short-term growth rates.  
A shock of one standard deviation in New York silver price causes New York silver price 
to rise by approximately 5 percent in one month. In the second month, its impact still induces 
silver price to increase at around 1 percent. It is until the fourth month that impact from the 
shock in silver price gradually fades. The same situation happens to the series of exchange rate. 
The exchange rate appreciates by roughly the same magnitude as response of silver price. In that 
sense, Chinese exchange rates were profoundly influenced by silver price in international market. 
Next the response of silver stock is negative and significant. Silver depreciation will lead to an 
increase in silver stock. Its most obvious impact happens in the second month later at around 0.4 
percent. In consideration of the average silver stock in Shanghai financial intermediates was 
around 344.28 million Chinese dollars, 0.4 percent increase equals to 1.38 million Chinese 
dollars gathering in Shanghai. Finally, response of Shanghai WPI is negative during the first four 
months. In the fifth month its impact turns to positive and then fades. In the first three months, 
silver depreciation will result in 0.5 percent domestic inflation continuously. In Figure 3.2, all the 
variables have significant responses towards a standard deviation in New York silver price.    
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Figure 3.2 Impulse Responses to world silver price shocks, 1929-1935 
Notes: the figure plots the impulse responses of endogenous variables to a shock in New York silver price 
index, obtained from four variables including New York silver price index, exchange rate, silver stocks 
and Shanghai WPI. 
 
Since exchange rate seems to have a closer linkage with international silver market, is it 
accurate to conclude that price pressure generated aboard was transmitted through exchange 
channel to Chinese domestic economy? To answer this question, we need to discuss the 
importance of exchange channel and monetary channel in two sub-periods. 
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Figure 3.3 Response of Shanghai WPI and its response decomposition, Jan 1929 to Jan 1933 
Notes: shock 1 represents New York silver price; shock 2 is exchange rate; shock 3 means silver stock, 
and shock 4 is Shanghai WPI. 
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Figure 3.3 plots variance decompostition of Shanghai WPI and its response to shocks in 
the first period. From January 1929 to January 1933, the driving force of inflation in Shanghai 
WPI is the depreciation of New York silver price, which could be seen from the lower panel. 
Nearly 50 percnet of changes in Shanghai WPI generated from New York silver price (blue line). 
Besides, in the first month, one standard devationation of depreciation in New York silver price 
will lead to 1.5 percent inflation in Shanghai. This situation lasts for three months and then its 
influences faded out.  As we discussed before, in the first period, New York silver price held a 
relative more stronger impact on Chinese exchange rate than silver stock. Is it accurate to say 
that in this period exchange channel acts more significantly compared to monetary channel? 
Based on the statistical results in the lower panel, the red line (exchange rate) lies above the 
green line (silver stock) in the figure of decomposition of shock in Shanghai WPI. This means 
exchange channel works better than monetary channel in this period.  
Meanwhile, if we further analyze the response of Shanghai WPI to shock in exchange 
rate, we could find an interesting phenomenon. In the first month, one unit depreciation in 
exchange rates lead to 0.5 percent infaltion. While in the third month,  one unit depreciation in 
exchange rates lead to 0.5 percent deflation. Its coefficients turn from negative to positive. That 
is to say short-term depreication of currency would lead to inflation which could promote 
economic development. But if the trend of depreication terminates, positive growth expectation 
turns to economic depression. Depending on currency inflation to promote ecnomic growth is 
fragile and short-signted. Besides, exposing Chinese domestic market to the risk of fluctuations 
in international silver price could not guarantee monetary policy independence. 
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Figure 3.4 Response of Shanghai WPI and its response decomposition, Feb 1933 to Dec 1935  
Notes: shock 1 represents New York silver price; shock 2 is exchange rate; shock 3 means silver stock, 
and shock 4 is Shanghai WPI. 
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Figure 3.4 plots variance decompostition of Shanghai WPI and its response to shocks in 
the second period. From February 1933 to Decemeber 1935, influeces from silver price went 
weaken (blue line), together with the impact from exchange rate (red line). On contrary, silve 
stock this time plays a relative more important role in promoting Shanghai WPI deflation. 
During the second period, ascending silver price stimulated silver legal exports and smuggling. 
Massive amount of silver bars or Chinese dollars were exported aboard for speculation and for 
gaining profits in over-heated real asset markets in Shanghai. Fragile Chinese monetary system 
could hardly endure such a heavy pressure transmitted from aboard. If we further analyze the 
responses of Shanghai WPI to silver stock. In the first month, one shock in silver stock would 
result in 1 percent decrease in Shanghai WPI. The forth month also illustrates 0.5 percent 
decrases and then its impact disappears. 
In a sum, from January 1929 to Jaunary 1933, the influence of silver depreication in New 
York market was trasnmited via exchange channel. While in the later period, when the most of 
countries went off the gold standard and competitively conducted deprecaiton monetary policies, 
artifically increased silver price facilitated silver exports and resulted in massive defaltion in 
domestic economy. Monetary channel has a more significnat impact on domestic wholesale price 
fluctuations in the second period. These SVAR test results are corresponding with the analysis of 
Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient in sector 3.2.1. But is it acceptable to draw the 
above conlcusion that exchange channel works well in the first preiod while monetary acts better 
later? We need to dig out more historical achive materials to support these findings in the next 
sector.  
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4. Historical explanation 
4.1 Exchange channel in the first period 
4.1.1 Prosperity of domestic industries  
In this sector, I will further explain the transmission mechanism of monetary channel and 
exchange channel in pre-war Chinese economy with historical facts. Previous analysis used 
macroeconomic statistics which offer a broad picture and are fit for conducting quantitative 
regression models. But if we want to dig out more trustworthy evidence for the final conclusion, 
merely depending on gross data is far from satisfaction. In order to take a closer look at 
microeconomic situations, we’d better focus on the growth history of certain industries.  
Our research question is to figure out how monetary channel and exchange channel 
transmitted silver price pressure from abroad to China’s domestic economy. Hence, the 
representative industries should have the features of dominating Chinese modern machined 
industries, involving in global market and integrating with rural areas. Modern industries 
burgeoned in China in the 1880s and were disproportionately concentrated in the Lower Yangzi 
Delta, particularly in Shanghai and cities along the Yangzi River.  In 1933 among all the 27 
major industries in Lower Yangzi Delta area, cotton spinning accounted for 43.87 percent 
(86,629,000 yuan) of total output, which acted as the engines of industrial growth in this region  
(Rawski, 1989). Cotton spinning industry ranked as the largest component of modern machined 
industries, which matches the first requirement. Secondly, there was an integrated global market 
for cotton industry. It confronted with keen competition from other countries, especially 
competitors in Asian regions.  Cotton spinning industry was sensitive to price fluctuations. 
Depreciation of silver price had a huge impact on both the domestic and foreign markets. Finally, 
urban factories obtained raw material from surrounding regions. In 1933, an estimated 60 percent 
of raw cotton used in the factories of Jiangsu province came from the regional rural sector 
(Shiroyama, 2009). Agricultural production and rural handicraft industries were intimately 
connected. Farm households cultivated cotton, spun yarn and wove cotton cloth in cotton-
producing areas. Hence based on the above reasons cotton-spinning industry was chosen to 
represent how domestic industries reacted to dramatic currency depreciation and appreciation in 
pre-war China. 
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The rural parts of the Lower Yangzi Delta have been short-staple cotton producing areas 
since the 15th century. Initially, farm households spun enough yarn merely to meet their family 
weaving needs. The raw cotton left over was sold in the market for transactions. For cotton 
producers in the early stage, it was more profitable to grow cotton and weave cloth. Hence yarn 
supply became the bottleneck of rural cotton industry in the Lower Yangzi Delta (Shiroyama, 
2008).  British coarse yarn became the first wave of imported yarn to bridge the gap after China 
was forced to open up treaty ports in the 1840s. However, due to the American Civil War, raw 
cotton exported from southern American plantations decreased which threatened production of 
British cotton industries. Then Indian short-staple yarn came to China in the 1870s. Due to its 
cheap price and high quality, Indian yarn quickly penetrated into Chinese market, especially in 
southern regions. Indian yarn competed with yarn produced in the Lower Yangzi Delta because 
they were both short-staple cotton which became substitution. Although Indian yarn had the 
merits of lower price and good quality, it took several decades for it became a powerful 
competitor. Farmers in the Lower Yangzi Delta were reluctant to accept foreign products. They 
preferred to spin their own yarn and weave cloth, although traditional producing process needed 
more demand of labor force and produced smaller amount of final goods.  With the integration of 
domestic market, cloth weavers in other regions gradually turned to Indian yarn, which forced 
farmers in the Lower Yangzi Delta to decrease prices.  
The mechanized manufacture of cotton goods began in 1890 as the contemporary 
government realized the necessity of stemming uncontrolled imports of Indian yarn. Between 
1896 and 1899, eight cotton-spinning mills were established. Production capacity rose from 
174,564 spindles in 1897 to 336,722 spindles in 1899.  Most of newly established cotton mills 
were located in the Lower Yangzi Delta. Shanghai alone hosted 161,084 spindles, consisting 48 
percent of the total production (Yan, 1963). The emerging of mechanized cotton spinning 
factories integrated the connection between urban manufacturing and rural farming. The factories 
obtained raw cotton from surrounding rural areas. Chinese mills’ managers signed contracts with 
farmers in exchange for their raw cotton. Afterwards they spun the cotton into yarn, distributed 
yarn among farmers. Managers ordered farmers to weave yarn into cloth and brought it back 
later. Their profits generated from the price difference between raw cotton and final cloth. Later 
Japan started to set up its own factories in treaty ports. Instead of producing conventional inferior 
cloth using short-staple yarn, they paid their attention to finer yarn which used long-staple cotton. 
By the end of 1930, 39 Japanese spinning mills produced over 1.6 million spindles in China 
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(Shiroyama, 2008). They not only produced cotton yarn but also produced cloth. Their major 
market was Northeast parts of China.  
The competition between Chinese, Indian and Japanese yarn not only laid in the quality 
and price, but also included the exchange rates which reflected the relative price changes in gold-
standard Indian rupee and Japanese Yuan against Chinese Teal on the silver standard. 
Theoretical explanation indicates that depreciation of one country’s currency will lead to descend 
in imports and ascent in exports. Export goods benefit from price competitiveness. Import 
commodities become relatively more expensive, which in turn may stimulate the setting up of 
domestic substitutive industries. The actual situation in China varied a little bit compared to 
theories. But the deprecation of silver from 1929 to 1931 indeed stimulated the growth of 
Chinese cotton industry and helped China to escape from the disaster of Great depression in the 
beginning.  
Silver price slumped from 57 cents per ounce to 30.2 cents per ounce during the January 
1929 to December 1931. Currency shrunk half of its previous value in two years increased the 
price of import goods marked in dollars or starlings. If the commodity price stayed the same, 
depreciation would lead to advantage. However, the price level of world production index also 
decreased from 104.28 to 72.23 in the same time period (Mattesini and Quintieri, 2007). That 
means to some extent the benefits of exchange rate depreciation was offset by global deflation. 
Another reason why the decline in Chinese imports index was more than assumed was the 
demand for yarn from aboard. In the brief boom of 1929-1931, Chinese cotton mills needed an 
estimated 12 million piculs of raw cotton. Domestic market could provide around 7 million and 
the other 5 million piculs of cotton had to import. Besides, as finer yarn became more popular 
among Chinese customers, long-staple cotton had to be imported because the main production 
from domestic farms was short-staple yarn.  In a sum, lower commodity price in other countries 
and irreplaceable demand diminish the shock to import index. The import index was decreased 
but better than expected.  
In term of export, silver currency depreciation indeed enhanced price competitiveness of 
Chinese exports but did not dramatically increased export amounts. The Great Depression 
seriously dampened purchasing power and lowered demand for Chinese products. Relatively 
lower price did not promote consumption as expected.  The weakened demand during the 
depression could hardly be stimulated by low exchange. In light of the depressed economic 
situations globally, Chinese export index still performed better compared to those of other 
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countries. The index number of export prices rose a little in 1930 and declined only slightly in 
1931, which means the Chinese producer, or at least the middleman, got some benefit from the 
fall of silver (Leavens, 1939). After 1931, Britain started to give up the gold standard and 
conduct currency depreciation policies. Sterling block countries followed its step, which 
weakened silver price advantage. Cotton mills in China suffered from relatively high price. In 
order to compete in global market, the average per-picul price of raw cotton decreased by 16 
percent, from 54.28 yuan in 1931 to 45.84 yuan in 1932 (Shiroyama, 2008) 
To sum up, decline in silver from January 1929 to January 1933 did not bring in dramatic 
change in trade situation as expected. China’s trade was in better condition compared to other 
countries on the beginning stage of the Great Depression thanks to the silver standard (Friedman, 
1963). Shocks from exogenous silver price fluctuations did not bring in damage to real economy.  
Monetary channel which supports the fluctuation in exchange rate alters trade situation did not 
work well. The theory of exchange channel means that it is possible for prices of gold or silver to 
change exogenously. The quantity of money circulated in one economic entity could adjust 
endogenously as a reaction to the exogenous price changes in global markets. Inflation in the 
early 1930s merely reflected domestically endogenous adjustment to exchange rate depression. 
Exchange channel performed better in the first period. 
4.1.2 Domestic silver movement  
Another reason why Shanghai silver stock data did not change much in the first period 
was that silver flows maintained a balanced movement between China’s rural and urban areas. 
Agricultural harvest in rural areas and prosperity in interior industries absorbed silver imports 
due to currency depreciation. The pre-war China’s financial system was not well established. 
Industry accounted for only 2.2 percent of domestic production in 1933, whereas the share of 
agricultural sector was 60 percent (James, 2001). Agriculture acted as economic foundation of 
pre-war China. However, farmers were the group of people who were vulnerable to natural or 
social disasters, which disturbed the stability of monetary system.  
In 1930, R. H. Tawney, a scholar of European social and economic history was invited to 
China and investigate the Chinese economy. He described China’s rural areas as ”There are 
districts in which the position of the rural population is that of a man standing permanently up to 
the neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him” (Shiroyama, 2008). Chinese 
farmers were hard to protect themselves from exogenous shock. A heavy rainfall, disease or 
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unexpected drought would wipe out a famers’ entire annual crop. From 1929 to 1931, the period 
when the silver standard isolated Chinese economy from the depression and favoring weather for 
agriculture, rural areas experienced net surpluses of silver shipped from Shanghai. Figure 4.1 
shows around 40 million yuan was transported to rural area annually.  
Farmers’ financial situation showed a strong feature of seasonality. Cotton industries in 
interior areas strongly depended on raw material so they were influenced by seasonal capital 
movement. Financial institutions in smaller cities such as Yangzhou, Zhenjiang and Benpu got 
its short-term credit from foreign banks or big native banks in the treaty ports like Shanghai or 
Ningbo. The silver gathered by native banks in smaller cities was further lent out to rural areas. 
As a consequence, silver circulated between cities and villages year round. Interest rates in 
Shanghai peaked twice a year, from April to June when silk, tea and wheat were on the market, 
and from August to October, when rice and cotton were harvested. Buyers in rural areas needed 
cash to pay for goods, hence Shanghai financial institutions experienced tight silver flows as 
money was sent to rural areas. In the rest of year, farmers had to buy daily necessities in rural 
market, hence the flow of silver reversed. Silver was transported back to Shanghai through the 
hierarchy of transactions between small rural retail shops, wholesale shops and merchants in big 
cities (Yang, 1933). Currency flowed from rural branches of native banks to their headquarters in 
treaty ports or to foreign banks where they got short-term credit.  
The Shanghai financial market was closely connected with domestic financial markets 
and impacted by their situations. The disastrous Yangzi River flood in 1931, together with the 
continuing military confrontations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist 
Party bear heavy burden on rural areas. The year of 1932 witnessed around 130 million of silver 
yuan drained from rural area to Shanghai. It was clear that the silver movement shifted 
dramatically in the reverse direction.  Without good agricultural production, farmers endured 
poverty and their purchasing power was declined. Native banks in small cities could not get their 
cash back from farmers so banks bore the effect of default. Unable to pay back the loan from 
Shanghai, native banks lost their creditworthiness to foreign banks as well. The fear of massive 
default was wide-spread after the year of 1933, when the silver price in global market turned to 
increase. The credit connection between big banks in Shanghai and banks in interior areas started 
to recede. Rural areas suffered from a lack of both money and credit. The difference in interest 
rates between rural areas and Shanghai widen.  
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Figure 4.1 Domestic silver movements to and from Shanghai, 1929-1933 
Source: Zhongwai shangye jinrong huibian 2. No.12 (Dec. 1935)  
Note: These data include shipments between Shanghai and the domestic open ports as well as stations on 
the Shanghai-Nanjing and Shanghai-Hangzhou-Ningbo railway lines.  
 
 In the first time period, Shanghai silver stock was not seriously impacted by depreciation 
of silver price in the global markets. Trade situation was not significantly benefit from cheaper 
Chinese currency. The Great Depression weakened purchasing power of many countries and 
lowered commodities price levels. Sharply reduced demand for Chinese good from aboard could 
hardly be stimulated by price competitiveness. Lowered commodities price further enhanced 
price advantages of import goods. Although Chinese trade situation performed better compared 
to other countries stuck to the mire of the depression, it did not call for net silver inflow in 
exchange for Chinese goods.  Moreover, China’s domestic silver movement worked well in the 
beginning stage of the Great Depression. Shanghai silver stock was not dramatic changed from 
1929 to 1933. Inflation in Chinese market was a reaction to exchange rate change through 
exchange channel. And it could not be ignored that the effect of exchange channel on the silver 
standard is more significant compared to on a gold stardard because the silver standard has a 
broader corridor between the silver point. But it is still limited compared to a more floating 
exchange rate after the China’s currency reform. 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Imports
Exports
32 
 
4.2 Monetary channel in the second period 
From February 1933 to December 1935, silver price in global markets experienced 
dramatic increase ranging from 23.4 cents per ounce to 74.7 cents per ounce. Appreciated trend 
of currency worsened China’s trade situation and deteriorated financial system. Silver flowed 
from interior areas to Shanghai, where foreign banks and native banks gathered silver and waited 
for a clear sign of silver appreciation. When the federal government issued a series of acts to “do 
something for silver”, a predictable silver appreciation stimulated massive amounts of 
speculation. Silver collected by foreign banks and native banks in treaty ports were shipped 
overseas for gaining arbitrage profits. Shocks to silver price not only impacted exchange rate, but 
also altered Chinese trade situation and drained silver stock, which enabled the monetary channel 
to play a primary role in determining deflated wholesale price in the second period.      
4.2.1 Breakdown of China’s financial system 
As illustrated in the previous sector, since 1931 China’s domestic silver started to move 
from interior regions to treaty ports, from rural areas to cities. Farmers suffered from poverty and 
native banks experienced credit scarcity.  Continuously decline in agricultural products further 
threatened their livings. In the context of the growing trade deficits from 1932 on, large amount 
of agricultural imports reduced the profits of domestic growers and put the country at the edge of 
food security.  The decline of rural economy endangered the interests of bankers, industrialists 
and citizens living in cities. A shared concern about reinvesting urban funds to rural areas was 
generated. However, as long as urban financial intermediates pursued profits, they would not 
take the risk of investing money in risky and unprofitable agricultural production. Deprived of 
sources for cash and loans, rural financial system found it extremely hard to sustain business. 
Massive amounts of silver gathered in treaty ports without reinvesting in rural economy.  
Conditions in domestic industries went worse as well. Cotton-spinning industry came 
across serious difficulty when the silver price appreciated. The international raw cotton price was 
sensitive to American cotton, which was the largest market share in the world. In the summer of 
1933, the federal government agreed to increase American raw cotton prices. The Indian and 
Egyptian raw cotton followed his step (Kindleberger, 2000). Appreciation of silver price further 
increased the cost of importing raw cotton to China. Meanwhile, yarn price dropped in global 
market. Inevitable downturn spiral forced the selling price of yarn below its production price. 
The cost of producing twenty-count yarn was 218.33 yuan per picul ( 159.75 for raw cotton, 50 
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yuan for miscellaneous fees and 8.58 yuan in tax), but market price was only 204 yuan, which 
means a loss of 14.33 yuan per picul (Shiroyama, 2008). Accumulated inventories disabled 
Chinese cotton mills to realize its profits, which put them at the risk of defaulting. They 
borrowed short-term loans from banks to purchase raw material and used their products or stock 
of raw material as collateral. When the price of raw material or products deceased, they were on 
the edge of bankruptcy.  
If banks believe that factories in question had an opportunity to recover, they would 
allow the mills to continue their operations under direct control from bank.  The way of 
supervision could be clarified into three categories. First, banks toke over management rights but 
reserved the previous structure of shareholders. Second, banks suspended the payment of 
previous loan and resigned a new one, which could be used as working capital so that the mills 
could repay interest regularly. Third, banks send out employees to take over the management 
issue and required cotton-spinning enterprises to pay back loans before meeting other expenses 
(Shiroyama, 2008). The continuous increasing silver price further worsened the economic 
condition for cotton-spinning industries. Investing in real economy would be of high risk and 
less profits.  
Shrinking profits generated form agricultural and industrial sector channeled banks’ 
investment into real asset markets and government bonds. The phenomenon of real estate 
investment fever happened in Shanghai as early as 1929. When the depreciated currency trend 
ensured increasing future real estate price, land prices in Shanghai started to soar together with 
booming construction and high-speed real estate turn over. Banks assigned many loans based on 
collateral of real asset, which were seen as secure guarantee and profitable assets. However, as 
the global silver price started to increase, prosperous real asset markets met difficulties. Investors 
got used to evaluate real asset price in terms of sterling and dollars. Competitive depreciation 
conducted by most of countries in 1933 lowered real asset price. The consequences of real asset 
price descending were enormous, not only because of most capital flows stuck to real asset 
market without sound cashability, but also due to the availability of credit based on real estate. 
Banks in Shanghai treaty ports operated with many loans based on real asset, which made them 
susceptible to real asset price fluctuations. Situation turned bad after August 1934, when massive 
amount of silver (65.85 million yuan) was exported abroad. People worried about the rapid 
drainage of silver reserves. They rushed to the banks, withdrew their bank deposits and hoarded 
the metal. Foreign banks suspended on collateral loans signed against real asset. Chinese native 
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banks also refused to renew loans on maturity. With devalued real assets on hand, the stability of 
cash flow in Shanghai financial institutions was undermined. 
In a sum, domestic silver movement flowed from interior areas to coastline treaty ports, 
from rural areas to big cities. Depressed rural economy and unprofitable industries did not attract 
silver flow into real economic sectors. Money chases after highest profits. Holding massive 
amount of silver stock on hand, bankers turned to put money into real asset markets and 
government bonds. However, as more countries depreciating their currencies and increasing 
silver price, inevitable downturn of real asset price threatened the stability of Chinese banking 
system. In the second time period, the sound monetary system bridging rural areas and cities, 
connecting industries with financial institutions were broke down. Silver was gathered in treaty 
ports and waited for being exported aboard the moment of high speculative space existed. 
4.2.2 American Silver Purchase Act and Chinese currency reform  
Britain went off the gold standard in September 1931. The depreciation of sterling raised 
silver price in the London market. Afterwards, the trend of appreciative silver currency against 
many other countries’ currencies appeared. One country after another, starting from sterling bloc 
to the federal government gave up the gold standard and conducted competitive exchange rates. 
The Unite States was the primary silver producer in the world. Utah, Arizona, Montana, 
Idaho, Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico were the states where American silver originated 
from (Pand, 1983). They controlled one-seventh of votes in the senate and supported Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to win the 1932 presidential campaign.  In return, Roosevelt met his commitment-“do 
something for the silver”.  Not long after he took office in March 1933 an issue of addressing the 
U.S. inflationary monetary and fiscal policies was carried out. One month later, Roosevelt issued 
an executive order forbidding the export of gold except to complete previous existing contracts 
or for transactions which approved by the president. In that sense, this act represented the United 
States went off the gold standard. Commodity price rose up including silver price in the New 
York market. On December 21, 1933 the Present ratifies the Pittman London Siler Amendment 
and issued the silver-purchase proclamation. It granted the U.S. mints the rights to purchase 
entire domestic newly minted silver at 64.5 cents per ounce, the price matched statutory price but 
20 cents more than market level.   
On June 19 1934, the Silver Purchase Act was passed by the Congress which acted as the 
most dramatic policy to increase global silver price artificially. The act aimed at increasing the  
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Figure 4.2 Recorded monetary net imports of silver to China, 1934-1935 
Source: Nankai annual statistics. 46-47 (Dec. 1936) 
U.S. silver stock until the ratio between silver and gold stocks reached one-fourth. When the 
silver price climbed over 1.29 dollar per ounce, the act also allowed the Treasury to sell silver.  
silver price in the New York market responded instantly to the policy. From 46.3 cents per ounce 
in June 1934 to 49.5 cents in August, in October the silver price rose up to more than 55 cents 
per ounce. The Price on the London silver market followed the growth pattern in the New York 
market as well. In fiscal year 1934, the amounts of silver purchased by the United Stated equaled 
to 32,068,495 ounces. The figure soared 13.6 times in 1935 which means 437,501,808 ounces 
(Leavens, 1935). 
The sudden rise in silver price caused by U.S. purchases act induced a massive flow of 
silver out of China and unset the silver-standard Chinese economy. Figure 4.2 illustrated the 
situation of China’s silver exports from 1934 to 1935. The massive outflow of silver started from 
August 1934, which reached to 19.06 million yuan. The next month witnessed 65.85 million 
yuan exports. Until the December 1934, total silver exports reached up to 228.33 million yuan, 
which equaled to twice the total silver exports in 1933. The situation maintained in the first half 
year of 1935. It was until the November of 1935 that the Chinese government conducted 
currency reform which finally removed Chinese economy away from the silver standard and cut 
off the link between international silver price and domestic exchange rate.  
There are several explanations for the vast increase in silver exports. First, as illustrated 
in sector 4.2.1, depression in agriculture and industries drained silver stock from interior areas 
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and gathered in major treaty ports. Individuals and companies transferred their funds to big 
native banks or foreign banks and waited for chance to transfer their fortune out of China. 
Foreign banks acted as the major intermediary to export silver abroad during these two years. 
Silver stock in foreign banks decreased from 275,660 (1933) to 54,672 thousand yuan (1934), 
which shrunk 80.15 percent merely in one year. The contemporary silver stock figure for native 
banks increased from 271,786 to 280,325 thousand yuan. Meanwhile native banks’ component in 
total silver stock in China increased from 49.6 percent to 83.7 percent. In 1935 another 18513 
thousand yuan and 40882 thousand yuan of silver was exported by foreign banks and native 
banks respectively. Wealthy Chinese purchased foreign exchange from foreign banks and they 
prefer to hoard foreign currency because of their clear appreciative expectation. They also 
remitted surplus founds aboard in fear of Chinese government suspended on silver conversion or 
export embargo. 
Kong Xiangxi, the minister of finance, said that “Government should take measures to 
safeguard China’s currency from a potentially dangerous strain on the country’s reserves and to 
place a check on the harsh deflationary forces that have been reflected in falling internal prices” 
(Shiroyama, 2008). To deal with serious economic situations and protected welfare of people, 
Chinese government imposed export duty and equalization charge on silver on October 14, 
which made speculators find it no profit to export silver aboard. This method would prevent a 
further fall in commodity prices in a short-term, but in a long-run the government faced with a 
dilemma: if the exchange rates moved up in together with the silver price, export goods would 
lose cost competitive. Export trade would be handicapped and internal deflation would continue; 
if the exchange rate decreased and it would increase the difference between the external and 
internal value of currency, which could be utilized to gain arbitrage profits.  
In the spring of 1935, international silver price rose steadily while the disparity between 
the exchange rate and export parity of silver ascended sharply after April. Government 
suspended the free silver export and authorized only a few institutions conduct silver trade, the 
official silver exports seemed improved in 1935. However, official prohibition of silver export 
did not stop smuggling of silver. Silver was shipped from Shanghai to other treaty ports like 
Canton or Harbin, which near Hong Kong and Japan where could be used for smuggling. On 
November fourth 1935, Chinese government conducted currency reform which officially gave up 
the silver standard.  The new system was a managed currency with the Chinese dollar unit no 
longer based on silver, but to be kept fixed in terms of foreign exchange. Four government-
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controlled commercial banks were granted the right to issue notes. The notes of the government 
banks had been backed by a reserve of 60 percent in silver and 40 percent in securities (Leavens, 
1939).  A central bank was established to coordinate selling or buying of foreign currencies in 
global market to maintain the stability of exchange rate. From now on, the fluctuations of silver 
standard could hardly influence Chinese domestic economy and its wholesale price level.  
The appreciation of China’s silver currency also has a profound impact on Chinese trade 
situations. Unlike the situation in the first period, appreciation of Chinese currency deteriorated 
trade balance.  Chinese exports penetrated into foreign markets where lower prices dominated. 
Ascending silver price diminished cost competitiveness of Chinese goods and decreased volume 
of Chinese exports. Figure 4.3 and 4.4 illustrated the export and import index of China from 
1929 to 1936.  With other countries went off the gold standard and conducted competitive 
deprecation policies, global wholesale price declined sharply. In competing with other countries, 
Chinese export goods had to lower its price. However, as China’s domestic industries 
experienced depression without abundant financial credits, it was hard for factories to adopt 
technology to lower its cost. The decline of export quantity index from 1933 to 1935 was in 
concern with the breakdown of domestic industries.  
 
Figure 4.3 Export Index of China, 1929-1936 
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Figure 4.4 Import Index of China, 1929-1936 
Source: Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-1952 [Compendium of Nan-k’ai index number 
materials]( Peking: China Social Sciences Press, 1988):555. 
The Figure 4.4 showed import situation of China from 1929 to 1936. Silver price started 
to increase in 1932. The pressure of appreciative exchange rate was transmitted to the price of 
import goods. The federal government issued several acts to protect interests of domestic 
agriculture producers through increasing price level. Hence the year of 1933 witnessed an 
increase trend in import price index of China which followed the international pattern. However, 
due to the recession in exports, the domestic industries had no motivation to import raw material 
(Shiroyama, 2008).  
In a sum from February 1933 to December 1935, depressed rural economy and domestic 
industries suffered from currency scarcity. Silver flowed out of interior areas and gathered in 
banks located in treaty ports, especially in Shanghai which acted as financial center of China. 
Artificially increased silver price in the global market left huge space for speculating. Massive 
amounts of silver were exported in 1934 and 1935. China’s economy experienced wide-spread 
deflation due to silver reserves scarcity, together with deterioration in trade deficits. Hence 
monetary channel which based on price-specie-flow mechanism worked more significantly in the 
second period. 
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5. Conclusion  
The main contribution of this paper is to check out the monetary transmission mechanism 
via which the exogenous price pressure generated in international silver markets was transmitted 
to China’s domestic economy. Adhered to the silver standard, silver was more than a commodity 
but served as currency in China. Silver price changed dramatically from 1929 to 1935. Initially, 
silver price in the New York market experienced downturn growth trend when the whole world 
suffered from the Great Depression. Then it started to increase due to competitive depreciation 
policies and a series of acts issued by the federal government. Silver price was not controlled by 
Chinese government. Its fluctuations were mostly due to the relative relationship between 
demand and supply of silver in international markets. Without sound monetary and centralized 
financial institutions, Chinese government lacked ability to conduct independent monetary 
policies to defend domestic economy from external shocks. The Chinese economic situation was 
closely linked to international silver markets.  
The monetary transmission channel discussed in this paper could be clarified into two 
categories- exchange channel and monetary channel. Based on the discussion above, exchange 
channel performed more significantly in the first period ranging from January 1929 to January 
1933. Ralph G. Hawtrey and Gustav Cassel advocated that quantity of money circulated in one 
economic entity could adjust endogenously as a reaction to the exogenous price changes in 
global markets. Given an internationally determined value of gold or silver, a country’s exchange 
rate is just dictated by the conversion rate of its national currency into gold. Through exchange 
channel, changes in exchange rate in one country do not necessarily influence a country’s trade 
situation which further modify its currency reserves and wholesale price level. Wholesale price 
directly responses to changes in exchange rate. Appreciation of one country’s currency would 
lead to deflation while depreciation would result in inflationary situation.  
The influence of exchange channel could be seen in the first period. Based on Spearman 
rank-order correlation, the testing result of the New York silver price and Chinese exchange rate 
equals to 0.884, which means one unit of decrease in New York silver price went together with 
88.4 percent depreciation of Chinese exchange rate. They both negatively correlated with 
wholesale price index in Shanghai at over 40 percent, which means fluctuations in New York 
market would transmit via influencing Chinese exchange rates and profoundly changing 
domestic price level. On contrary, one unit decrease of silver stock merely went together with 4.5 
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percent inflation in Shanghai market. Comparing with 40.1 percent correlation value between 
exchange rate and wholesale price index, silver stock obviously showed less influence on 
domestic inflation during the early 1930s. Besides, one unit appreciation of silver in New York 
merely accompanied with 1.3 percent increase of silver stock. Hence, from January 1929 to 
January 1933, inflation in Chinese market was transmitted from descending price in the New 
York market through exchange channel. Then according to the variance decompostition of 
Shanghai WPI and its response to shocks based on Structural VAR model, the driving force of 
inflation in Shanghai WPI is the devalutation of New York silver price. Nearly 50 percent of 
changes in Shanghai WPI generated from New York silver price. Besides, in the first month, one 
standard devationation of depreciation in New York silver price will lead to 1.5 percent change 
in Shanghai wholesale price. This situation lasted for three months and then its influence faded 
out. Combined with the analysis of  the response of Shanghai WPI to shock in exchange rate, one 
unit depreciation in exchange rates lead to 0.5 percent infaltion. The econometric findings 
proved that exchange channl worked better compared to monetary channel. 
Historical analysis further verifty the previous finding. Decline in silver price from 
January 1929 to January 1933 did not bring in dramatic change in trade situation as expected. 
The Great Depression weakened purchasing power of other countries and lowered international 
commodities’ price levels. Sharply reduced demand for Chinese good from aboard could hardly 
be stimulated by cost competitiveness due to currency depreciation. Lowered commodities price 
further diluted price disadvantages of import goods. Although Chinese trade situation performed 
better compared to other countries stuck to the mire of the depression, it did not call for an 
increase in silver net inflow in exchange for Chinese goods.  Moreover, China’s domestic silver 
movement worked well at the beginning stage of the Great Depression. Rural areas experienced 
net silver inflow. Interest rates in Shanghai peaked twice a year, from April to June when silk, 
tea and wheat were on the market, and from August to October, when rice and cotton were 
harvested. Buyers in rural areas needed cash to pay for goods, hence Shanghai financial 
institutions experienced tight silver flows as money was moved to rural areas. In the rest of year, 
farmers had to buy daily necessities in rural markets, and the flow of silver reversed. Hence 
Shanghai silver stock was not dramatic changed from 1929 to 1933, if compared with massive 
amount of silver exports in the second period. Inflation in Chinese market was a reaction to 
exchange rate change through exchange channel. 
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In the second period ranging from February 1933 to December 1935, monetary channel 
acted as primary transmission channel where exogenous shocks to silver price resulted in 
drainage of silver reserves. Through monetary channel a country’s price level is determined by 
the amount of money held by central banks or circulated within an economic entity. Less money 
controlled by central banks generally could be interpreted as less bank credits. Currency scarcity 
leads to deflation which enhances declining expectation of commodities’ price level and further 
decreases wholesale price index. The amount of money held by central banks under the silver 
standard could be influenced by the difference between exchange rate and silver price in global 
market.  If the price of silver in Shanghai was higher than those in other parts of the world, 
speculators would gain profits through importing silver to China. Similarly, if the global silver 
price was far above price parity, traders would be stimulated to export silver abroad in exchange 
for appreciating foreign currency.  
According to Spearman rank-order correlation, Now York silver price and exchange rate 
also have roughly the same correlation values against other variables. Their mutual correlation 
coefficient decreased from 88.4 percent in the first period to 58.7 percent in the second period. 
The growth pattern of exchange rates seemed less coordinate with that of New York silver price. 
Besides, their impact on domestic wholesale price declined from over 40 percent to 4.7 percent 
in Shanghai treaty port. Comparatively, absolute values of correlation between silver stock and 
wholesale price increased from 4.5 percent to 38.1 percent in Shanghai market. From February 
1933 to December 1935, silver stock values showed stronger correlation with wholesale price 
index which means monetary channel played a more important role in transmitting silver price 
pressure from abroad. Then the variance decompostition of Shanghai WPI and its response to 
shocks showed that from February 1933 to Decemeber 1935, influeces from silver price went 
weaken, together with the impact from exchange rate. On contrary, silve stock this time played a 
relative more important role in promoting Shanghai WPI deflation. In the first month, one shock 
in silver stock would result in 1 percent decrease in Shanghai WPI. The forth month witnessed 
0.5 percent decrases and then its impact disappeared. 
Historical archieve also illustrated that banks in treaty ports gathered silver stocks and 
exported it abroad in large quantity. Domestic silver flowed from interior areas to coastline treaty 
ports and from rural areas to big cities. Depressed rural economy and unprofitable industries did 
not attract silver flow back into real economic sectors. Holding massive amount of silver stock 
on hand, bankers turned to invest money to real asset markets and government bonds. However, 
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as more countries depreciating their currencies and increasing silver price, inevitable downturn 
trend of real asset price threatened the stability of Chinese banking system. Silver was gathered 
in treaty ports and waited for being exported aboard the moment of high speculative space 
existed.  Artificially increased silver price in global markets left huge space for speculating. 
Massive amount of silver was exported in 1934 and 1935. China’s economy experienced wide-
spread deflation due to silver reserves scarcity, together with deterioration in trade deficits. 
Hence monetary channel which based on price-specie-flow mechanism worked more 
significantly in the second period. 
In a sum, exchange channel worked better in the first period while monetary channel 
played a more significant role in the second period. The currency’s close linkage to silver price 
limited the government’s ability to manipulate economy and conduct independent monetary 
policies. Meanwhile, currency reserves were scattered without centralized control over note 
issuance or credit expansion. When the money was abundant in the market, financial institutions 
would operate well because of sufficient credits. Once booming silver price stimulated 
speculators to export silver which made the silver reserves tight, a disastrous scramble for cash 
existed and it further worsen deflation.  Adhered one country’s currency to a commodity whose 
price is determined exogenously would be a threat to economic stability. Hence, it was essential 
for China to leave the silver standard for the sake of financial recovery and economic 
independence.   
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Appendix A: Data sources  
𝑆𝑃𝑡 : New York silver price, cents per ounce. Source: Statistics Monthly (tongji yuebao),1932-6. 
 𝐸𝑡  : Chinese exchange rate, US dollars per 1000 Chinese dollars. Source: Statistics Monthly 
(tongji yuebao),1932-6. 
 𝑆𝑆𝑡: Silver stock in Shanghai, thousand yuan. Source: Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-
1952 [Compendium of Nan-k’ai index number materials] (1988), China Social Sciences 
Press, pp. 486-490. 
 𝑃𝑡 : Shanghai wholesale price index, 1926=100. Source: Statistics Monthly (tongji yuebao), 
1932-6. 
𝑃𝑡-tj: Tianjing wholesale price index, 1926=100. Source: Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 
1913-1952 [Compendium of Nan-k’ai index number materials] (1988), China Social 
Sciences Press, pp. 13-18. 
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